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Armchair  evidence  shows  that  many  industries  are  made  of  a  few  big  commercial  or 
manufacturing ﬁrms, which are able to affect the market outcome, and of a myriad of small 
family-run businesses with very few employees, each of which has a negligible impact on the 
market. Examples can be found in apparel, catering, publishers and bookstores, retailing, ﬁnance 
and  insurances,  and  IT  industries.  We  provide  a  new  general  equilibrium  framework  that 
encapsulates both market structures. Due to the higher toughness of the market, the entry of big 
ﬁrms leads them to sell more through a market expansion effect, which is generated by the exit of 
small ﬁrms. Furthermore, the level of social welfare increases with the number of oligopolistic 
ﬁrms because the procompetitive effect associated with the entry of a big ﬁrm dominates the 
resulting decrease in product variety. 
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Armchair evidence shows that many industries are made of a few large com-
mercial or manufacturing ﬁrms, which are able to aﬀect the market outcome,
and of a myriad of small family-run businesses with very few employees, each
of which has a negligible impact on the market. Examples can be found in
apparel, catering, publishers and bookstores, retailing, ﬁnance and insur-
ances, and IT industries. To the best of our knowledge, such a mixed market
structure has been overlooked in the literature.1 This is surprising because
such a conﬁguration of ﬁrms is both widespread and old. Indeed, although
ﬁrms started operating at a very low scale at the beginning of the Industrial
Revolution, the growth of larger and larger establishments, due to techno-
logical innovations, was progressive and slow, involving both large and small
ﬁrms in various proportions according to the industry. Average plant size
increased in most industries, but small and medium-sized ﬁrms continued to
be, and still are, the rule in many sectors (Mokyr, 2002). It is also worth
mentioning that business analysts stress the fact that ﬁrms within the same
industry often form strategic groups that operate diﬀerently. In particular,
an industry is typically divided into a group of big ﬁrms and a competitive
fringe of much smaller ﬁrms (Porter, 1982).
Such a neglect is unwarranted from the viewpoint of competition policy
because several countries have passed bills that restrict the entry of large
ﬁrms or the expansion of existing ones, forbid price discounts or regulate
the hours of operations in order to permit small ﬁrms to remain active. To
illustrate, consider the case of the retailing sector, which has attracted a lot
of attention in several countries. In France, the Royer-Raﬀarin Law imposes
severe restrictions on the entry of department stores whose surface exceeds
300 square meters, the purpose being that small shops provide various con-
venience services. The Net Book Agreement in the United Kingdom between
book publishers and retailers forbids discounts on books with the aim of
preserving a large network of small bookstores, whereas in France the Lang
Law, which also prevents price discounting, is argued by the publishers and
small book sellers to be justiﬁable on the same grounds. It would be easy to
mention more real-world examples.
1The main noticeable exception we are aware of is provided by the dominant ﬁrm model
in which one large ﬁrm and a competitive fringe coexist (Markham, 1951). Another set of
contributions deal with “big agents” (formally, atoms) whose role in exchange economies
have been studied within the context of cooperative game theory (Gabszewicz and Shi-
tovicz, 1992). Finally, Neary (2003) uses a framework that combines a large number of
sectors, each having a small number of ﬁrms. It is worth stressing that, despite some
resemblance, all these models are very diﬀerent from ours.
3Even though the objective of such laws and regulations was often to
gain the political support of small-business associations, popular thinking
in developed countries has it that small ﬁrms allow for a wider array of
varieties and services, thus contributing to consumers’ welfare. Very much in
the same spirit, starting with Sears Roebuck and the emergence of mail order
ﬁrms in the late 19th century, the American public has proven wary of retail
innovations. Wal-Mart, the largest retailer in America and the pioneer of the
large discount chain store, experiences the same public wariness regarding
its business practices. Even though several of the criticisms raised might be
justiﬁed, we ﬁnd it fair to say that the public often dismisses the fact that
the presence of large retailers fosters much lower prices than small ones, thus
making a wider array of goods accessible to a larger population of customers
(Basker, 2007).
As a second motivation, we should add that the ﬁeld of industrial or-
ganization is dominated by partial equilibrium models of oligopoly in which
strategic interactions between ﬁrms appear to be the central ingredient. They
now serve as the corner-stone of many competition policy studies of real-
world markets (Motta, 2004). By contrast, monopolistic competition has
been extensively employed as the main building-block in the analyses of im-
perfect competition within general equilibrium models developed in various
economic ﬁelds. Examples include economic policy, growth and innovation,
international trade, and economic geography (Matsuyama, 1995). It is fair
to say that both approaches are useful to analyze diﬀerent economic issues
and have their own merits. However, as said in the foregoing, it is a fact that
many industries consist of a few big ﬁrms and many small ﬁrms. In such
industries, the big ﬁrms behave strategically, whereas small ﬁrms maximize
their proﬁts on the residual demand in the absence of strategic interactions.
This paper may then be viewed as an attempt at providing a reconciliation
between such diﬀerent approaches to market competition.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a uniﬁed approach that embodies
both big/strategic and small/nonstrategic ﬁrms and to assess the relevance
of the above arguments. More precisely, we use this framework to study
(i) how those two types of ﬁrms interact to shape the market outcome and
(ii) whether or not it is socially desirable to have large and/or small ﬁrms
in business. To reach our goal, we blend two standard models of imperfect
competition, namely the oligopoly model à la Cournot with diﬀerentiated
products and the monopolistic competition model of the Chamberlin-type.2
2The bulk of the literature on general equilibrium with oligopolistic ﬁrms focuses on
Cournot competition. Therefore, to facilitate comparison we have chosen to focus on
quantity-setting ﬁrms. Note, in passing, that the diﬀerence between price-setting and
quantity-setting ﬁrms is inconsequential for the behavior of small ﬁrms.
4On the production side, we consider a diﬀerentiated product market in which
both oligopolistic and monopolistically competitive ﬁrms coexist. In measure
theoretic-terms, each oligopolistic ﬁrm is an atom, whereas each monopolis-
tically competitive ﬁrm is negligible. Because small ﬁrms typically exhibit
more volatility than big ﬁrms in their entry behavior, we ﬁnd it reasonable
to assume that the mass of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms adjust to the
number of oligopolistic ﬁrms until proﬁts in the competitive fringe are zero,
as in Chamberlin (1933). On the consumption side, we consider a utility
function with a symmetric CES subutility, as in Spence (1976) and Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977). However, unlike these contributions, our model involves
both discrete and negligible varieties of the diﬀerentiated product. By so
doing, we capture within the same preference framework the two speciﬁca-
tions of the CES model that have been used in the literature (Vives, 1999;
Matsuyama, 1995).3 The diﬀerence between “big” and “small” ﬁrms is thus
apprehended through both ﬁrms’ behavior and consumers’ preferences, one
being the mirror image of the other.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. First, the entry of an oligopolistic ﬁrm
extends the market of these ﬁrms at the expense of monopolistically compet-
itive ﬁrms. Hence, deregulating mixed markets is likely to lead to a pro-
gressive disappearance of small ﬁrms.4 Furthermore, this market expansion
eﬀect is suﬃciently strong for the output of each big ﬁrm to rise. Similarly,
it leads to a decrease in the price index of the industry as a whole, and so
despite the fact that the entry of a big ﬁrm sparks the exit of small ﬁrms.
This agrees with Bertrand and Kramarz (2002), who show that the enforce-
ment of the Royer-Raﬀarin Law has had a negative impact on job creation
in France. This in turn suggests that this regulation has lowered the output
and increased the price index of the French retail sector, as suggested by our
model.5 Conversely, a smaller number of large producers fosters the entry of
small ﬁrms. This is illustrated by the recent evolution of the beer industry,
which is characterized by the concentration of large producers as well as by
the growing emergence of small breweries. Finally, our analysis reveals the
existence of a new general equilibrium eﬀect: because of the market expan-
sion eﬀect, big ﬁrms are better oﬀ when entry arises under the concrete form
3Recall that Dixit and Stiglitz assumed a continuum of varieties in their initial discus-
sion paper reprinted in Brakman and Heijdra (2004).
4In this respect, it is worth noting that there has been in the UK a sharp decline in the
number of small groceries after the passage of the Resale Prices Act in 1964 abolishing
resale price maintenance (Everton, 1993).
5By restricting the entry of large retailers, the Raﬀarin Law has led to higher prices
for food products. This has been estimated to a loss of €9 billion for French consumers in
2002 (Askenazy and Weindenfell, 2007).
5of a new large ﬁrm and the exit of a range of small ones.
In terms of welfare, we show the unexpected (at least to us) result that,
despite the exit of small ﬁrms it triggers, the entry of a big ﬁrms is always
beneﬁcial to consumers. In other words, the loss of variety that the smaller
mass of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms generates is more than compen-
sated by the fact the whole industry becomes more competitive when more
oligopolistic ﬁrms operate. Because it imposes no speciﬁc restriction on the
structural parameters of the economy, this result casts serious doubt on the
welfare foundations of the various laws and regulations that tend to keep
active a large number of small businesses. Note, in passing, that our analy-
sis provides analytical foundations to what Schumpeter wrote more than 60
years ago:
“In the case of retail trade the competition that matters arises not
from additional shops of the same type, but from the department store,
the chain store, the mail-order house and the supermarket which are
bound to destroy those pyramids sooner or later.” (Schumpeter 1942,
p.85)
Admittedly, our results are obtained in the case of a speciﬁc model,
namely the CES. Being aware of its limits, we want to stress the fact that
this model is the workhorse of many contributions dealing with imperfect
competition in modern economic theory. So our results cannot be dismissed
on that basis only. Although more work is called for, we believe that our
analysis, by providing a uniﬁed framework encapsulating diﬀerent market
structures, uncovers new and unsuspected insights about a topic that has
been so far neglected. In addition, it is worth stressing that we depart from
standard partial equilibrium models in that the income level is endogenous in
our framework. Finally, our approach reveals how the emergence of a mixed
market structure depends on the size of economy and the level of ﬁxed costs
in the two subsectors.
That said, our analysis also sheds light on some of the major trends
characterizing the market dynamics of developed economies. Considering a
traditional economy which is typically populated with small businesses, our
results show that more aﬄuent societies and technological progress have com-
bined to facilitate the entry of a growing number of big ﬁrms. This in turn
has triggered the decline of the small business subsector in mixed markets
endowed with old and small ﬁrms as well as modern and big ﬁrms. Such
a result concurs with the prediction made by many observers, ranging from
Karl Marx to Robert Lucas. However, our analysis also suggests that the
fall in small ﬁrms’ ﬁxed costs sparked by the development of the new infor-
mation technologies has permitted the revival of SMEs. Indeed, as predicted
6by our model, the launching of small ﬁrms became again proﬁtable from the
1980s, which has led to the progressive emergence of new mixed markets. The
evolution of markets, therefore, seems to be a non-monotonic process, involv-
ing the transition from monopolistic competition to mixed markets through
markets dominated by large oligopolistic ﬁrms. It is worth stressing that this
agrees with a well-documented fact stressed in the economic and business lit-
erature on entrepreneurship, that is, the existence of a U-shaped relationship
between entrepreneurship and economic development (see Wennekers et al.,
2009 for a survey and empirical evidence).
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. The details of the
model are provided in Section 2. Section 3 deals with the main properties of
a mixed market equilibrium. The welfare analysis is taken up in Section 4,
whereas Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The representative consumer
The economy involves two goods, two sectors, and one production factor -
labor. The ﬁrst good is homogenous and produced by the traditional sector
under constant returns to scale and perfect competition. This good is chosen
as the numéraire.6 Without loss of generality, we assume that one unit
of the homogenous good is produced by using one unit of labor. Without
loss of generality, we may assume that one unit of the homogenous good is
produced by using one unit of labor. The equilibrium wage is thus equal to 1.
The other good is a horizontally diﬀerentiated good produced in the modern
sector. It is supplied both by oligopolistic ﬁrms and by monopolistically
competitive ﬁrms (MC-ﬁrms). Variables associated with oligopolistic ﬁrms
are described by capital letters and those corresponding to MC-ﬁrms by
lower case letters (this should help the reader to remember that an MC-ﬁrm
is smaller than an oligopolistic ﬁrm). Each ﬁrm supplies a single variety,
thus implying that oligopolistic ﬁrms do not contribute to product variety
by supplying a product line, as in Brander and Eaton (1984). Let N ≥ 2 be
the number of varieties supplied by oligopolistic ﬁrms and M > 0 the mass
of varieties supplied by MC-ﬁrms. In other words, the diﬀerentiated sector is
6The choice of the numéraire in general equilibrium models with imperfect competition
is often a critical issue because it may aﬀect the nature of the market outcome (Bonanno,
1990). Since our purpose is to focus on the interactions between diﬀerent types of ﬁrms
belonging to the same industry, we ﬁnd it reasonable to retain the homogeneous good as
the numéraire (Ginsburgh and Keyzer, 1997).
7mixed in that it is constituted by two subsectors governed by distinct forms
of competition, which interact according to rules that will be made precise
below.
There exists a representative consumer who describes the aggregated be-
havior of a population of consumers having diﬀerent tastes (Anderson et al.,
1992). This agent is endowed with L units of labor, holds the shares of

















where Qj is the output level of oligopolistic ﬁrm j = 1,...,N, q(i) the output
level of the MC-ﬁrm i ∈ [0,M], X the aggregate consumption of the homoge-
nous good, whereas α and ρ are given parameters satisfying the inequalities
0 < α < 1 and 0 < ρ < 1. The upper-tie utility being of the Cobb-Douglas
type, the homogenous good is always produced. Hence, the equilibrium wage
remains equal to 1 regardless of ﬁrm’s behavior in the modern sector. This
highlights the role played by the traditional sector in our setting.
The novel feature of preferences (1) is that they incorporate both “dis-
crete” varieties, Qj, and “negligible” varieties, q(i). Such a modeling strat-
egy allows us to capture two important characteristics of a mixed market.
First, each discrete variety has a positive impact on consumers’ well-being,
whereaseach negligible variety has a zero impact. This asymmetry reﬂects
the idea that big ﬁrms provide additional attributes appended to their prod-
uct - and, perhaps, a better access to other goods and services -, while small
ﬁrms supply basic attributes only. Second, whereas there is a ﬁnite number
of discrete varieties, there is a continuum of negligible varieties. Altogether
small ﬁrms have, therefore, a positive impact on consumers’ utility that is
comparable to big ﬁrms. These two features may be viewed as the demand
counterpart of the assumptions made below about ﬁrms’ market behavior.7
Yet, the representative consumer has a priori no preference on the type of
ﬁrms from which she buys, meaning that her choices are not biased in favor
of small against big ﬁrms, or vice versa. However, the process of substitution
between the two types of varieties is more involved than in standard oligopoly
or monopolistic competitive models. To illustrate how it works, consider the
situation in which the quantities of discrete varieties j = 1,...,N are the
same and equal to Q, whereas the quantity density of negligible varieties
7Alternately, we could have assumed that large ﬁrms supply a positive segment of
varieties. We have chosen to use mass-points instead of intervals because this formulation
would bias the result in favor of the large ﬁrms by allowing them to increase product
variety. We will return to this issue in our concluding section.
8is uniform and equal to q over [0,M]. Let us now assume that there is
a (N + 1)th discrete variety and consider the variation of the total mass
of negligible varieties that leaves the utility level unchanged. It is readily
veriﬁed that M must decrease by ∆M = (Q/q)
ρ. Hence, despite the fact
that consumers have a love for variety, for the utility level to remain the
same, the entry of a new discrete variety is to be compensated by the exit of
a positive range of negligible varieties.
























p(i)q(i)di + X ≤ Y
where Pj is the price of variety j = 1,...,N, p(i) the price of variety i ∈ [0,M],
and Y the income level given by her wage plus the sum of distributed proﬁts.
It is useful to decompose this problem into two steps. In the ﬁrst one, we













where we interpret Q0 as the output index of the MC-subsector. The ﬁrst
order conditions for an interior maximum are as follows:





















be the price index of the monopolistically competitive varieties. We may
then rewrite Q0 as follows:









= R   (P0)
− 1
1−ρ (3)
9so that R = P
1/(1−ρ)
0 Q0, which in turns implies that
q(i) = R   [p(i)]
−
1−ρ
ρ = Q0   [p(i)]
−
1−ρ
ρ   P
1
1−ρ
0 for all i ∈ [0,M]. (4)
Hence, the demand function of an MC-ﬁrm decreases with its own price but
increases with two aggregate statistics, Q0 and P0, which encapsulate the
aggregate behavior of the competitive fringe.
Substituting (3) and (4) into the original maximization problem yields

















PjQj + X ≤ Y.




























PjQj − X = 0 (7)
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier. Let P be the industry price index,














so that P increases with the price (Pj) of any discrete variety j = 1,...,N as
well as with the price index of the MC-subsector (P0). It is readily veriﬁed
that the system (5)-(7) imply that the demand functions are given by
Qj =(1 − α)Y(Pj)
−1/(1−ρ) P
ρ/(1−ρ) ≡ D(Pj,P,Y) j = 1,...,N (9)
X =αY
q(i) =(1 − α)Y[p(i)]
−1/(1−ρ)P
ρ/(1−ρ) ≡ d[p(i),P,Y] i ∈ [0,M] (10)
where D(Pj,P,Y) is the demand function of the oligopolistic variety j =
1,...,N and d[p(i),P,Y] that of the MC-variety i ∈ [0,M]. The fact that
10the functional forms D (resp., d) is independent of j (resp., i) reﬂects the
symmetry of preferences on the varieties supplied by the corresponding sub-
sector. There is a major diﬀerence, however. Small ﬁrms face demands
having the same constant elasticity, whereas big ﬁrms’ demands displays a
variable elasticity since P changes with Qi.As to be expected, both D and
d are decreasing in their own price when Y is ﬁxed. Under the same con-
dition, using (2) and (9), it is easy to show that ∂D(Pj,P,Y)/∂Pk > 0 for
all j,k = 1,    ,N and k  = j, thus implying that the varieties provided by
the large ﬁrms are strong gross substitutes. As the same holds for j = 0, we
may conclude that the output index of the MC-subsector plays the same role
in consumption as any variety of the oligopolistic subsector. Recall that the
fraction of the income spent on the diﬀerentiated good is constant and given
by 1 − α. To ease the burden of notation, we set Yd ≡ (1 − α)Y but use Y
each time ambiguity could arise.
2.2 Oligopolistic ﬁrms
Each oligopolistic ﬁrm selects its output level to maximize its proﬁt. Hence,
the solution to the interactive proﬁt-maximizing problem is given by a Nash
equilibrium of the following strategic-form game: (i) the players are the N
oligopolistic ﬁrms; (ii) the strategy of ﬁrm j = 1,...,N is its output level Qj;
and (iii) the payoﬀ for player j is given by its proﬁt function
Πj(Q1,    ,QN;Y,Q0) = Ψj(Q1,    ,QN;Y,Q0)Qj − CQj − F
where Ψj( ) is the inverse demand function for the product of oligopolistic
ﬁrm j, C > 0 the constant marginal cost and F > 0 the ﬁxed cost of an
oligopolistic ﬁrm. In order to allow for at least two big ﬁrms to be active, we
assume throughout this paper that L > 2F.
The demand functions (9) and (10) allow us to describe the market be-
havior of both types of ﬁrms. First, an oligopolistic ﬁrm is aware that its
strategy aﬀects the industry price index P and is, therefore, involved in a
game-theoretic environment. It also understands that the price index P is
inﬂuenced by the aggregate behavior of the MC-ﬁrms, as expressed by Q0.
Finally, each oligopolistic ﬁrm should also account for the fact that its strate-
gic choice generates an income eﬀect, through proﬁt distribution, which af-
fects itself the level of demand for its variety. However, for reasons discussed
below, we assume that these ﬁrms treat the income level as a parameter,
even though the income will be endogenously determined. Thus, the proﬁt
maximization problem of oligopolistic ﬁrm j is given by
Maximize
Qj
Πj(Q1,    ,QN;Y,Q0).
11By contrast, being negligible to the market, each MC-ﬁrm may accurately
treat the price index P and the income Y as parameters when selecting its
proﬁt-maximizing output. Hence, unlike the oligopolistic ﬁrms, the MC-ﬁrms
do not behave strategically.




j Pρ and substituting this ex-


















j Pρ then yields the inverse demand
function for variety j = 1,...,N:











which depends on the output of each oligopolistic ﬁrm as well as on the
aggregate output of the MC-subsector. Consequently, the proﬁt function of
ﬁrm j may be written as follows:











− CQj − F. (12)
Let Q−j ≡ (Q1,...[Qj],...,QN) be the vector of all outputs but that of
ﬁrm j. Because ∂Πj/∂Qj is strictly decreasing in Qj, we have:
Lemma 1. For any j = 1,...,N and any given Q−j and Q0, Πj is strictly
concave with respect to Qj over [0,∞).
Hence, the best reply function Q∗
j(Q−j;Y,Q0) of ﬁrm j is the unique




















￿2 − C = 0. (13)
Despite the fact that oligopolistic varieties are substitutes, Qj and Qk
need not be strategic complements or substitutes. Furthermore, even though
Q0 is not chosen by a player per se, the output index of the MC-subsector
may also be a strategic substitute or a strategic complement of oligopolistic
ﬁrms’ output. Among other things, this implies that an expansion of the
MC-subsector (through an increase of M) does not necessarily imply that
12oligopolistic ﬁrms lower their output. However, we will see below that we
have a “well-behaved model” in that an increase in the number of ﬁrms of
each type leads to lower prices for these ﬁrms as well as a decrease of the
overall price index.
2.3 Monopolistically competitive ﬁrms




p(i)q(i) − cq(i) − f subject to q(i) = d[p(i),P,Y]
where c > 0 is the constant marginal cost and f > 0 the ﬁxed cost of a
MC-ﬁrm. Note that, for the economy to supply the homogenous good, it
must be that
L > NF + Mf. (14)
This implies the existence of the upper bound (L−NF)/f on the size of the
competitive fringe that depends on the number of oligopolistic ﬁrms.











ρ − cq(i) − f
where, unlike oligopolistic ﬁrms, MC-ﬁrms accurately treat the price index
P parametrically. This diﬀerence in ﬁrms’ behavior reﬂects the diﬀerence in
the underlying market structure that characterizes each subsector.





Since ρ < 1, π(i) is strictly concave in q(i). The ﬁrst order condition for























13This equilibrium is unique and symmetric for any given vector (Q1,    ,QN).
Whereas the equilibrium price is constant, the equilibrium size of an MC-ﬁrm
is a function of the price index P and, therefore, depends on the quantities
chosen by the oligopolistic ﬁrms. For any given M and N, the equilibrium
proﬁt of an MC-ﬁrm is thus:








1−ρ − f (16)






ρ − CQ − F.
Finally, the mass M of MC-ﬁrms given N is determined by the zero-proﬁt
condition π = 0.
Observe that, in all the foregoing expressions, the total income given by
Y = L + NΠ + Mπ (17)
is inherently variable because proﬁts are endogenous and redistributed to the
representative consumer.
3 The market outcome
A market equilibrium is deﬁned as a state in which the following conditions
simultaneously hold: (i) the representative consumer maximizes her utility
subject to the budget constraint, (ii) both oligopolistic and MC-ﬁrms max-
imize their own proﬁts with respect to output, (iii) oligopolistic ﬁrms earn
positive proﬁts, (iv) the mass of MC-ﬁrms is such that M∗π∗ = 0, and (v)
all markets clear. Hence, for a given number N of oligopolistic ﬁrms,8 the
mass of MC-ﬁrms is adjusted until their proﬁts are zero or there is no MC-
subsector:
M
∗ > 0 ⇒ π
∗ = 0
π
∗ < 0 ⇒ M
∗ = 0.
When N > 0 and M∗ > 0, we say that the market equilibrium is mixed.
Clearly, the resource constraint (14) implies that L − NF − M∗f > 0.
8Our aim being to study how the market and consumer welfare react to the entry of a
big ﬁrm, we treat N as exogeneous.
14Even though the output index of the MC-subsector and the total income
are endogenous, when choosing its own output level, each oligopolistic ﬁrm
treats them as parameters. The ﬁrst assumption accounts for the fact that
the market outcome is given by a Nash equilibrium of a game in which both
big and small ﬁrms move simultaneously. The second implies that the big
ﬁrms behave as income-takers in that they neglect the impact that their
output decisions have on the total income, hence on their demands, through
the distribution of proﬁts (Gabszewicz and Vial, 1972; d’Aspremont et al.,
1989, 1996). In contrast, MC-ﬁrms accurately treat the total income as a
parameter. However, both types of ﬁrms understand that a higher - or lower
- income inﬂuences positively - or negatively - the level of their demands.
More precisely, in equilibrium all ﬁrms anticipate correctly what the total
income will be. That said, we want to stress the fact that our model is not a
partial equilibrium one, the diﬀerence being that the income level is exoge-
nous in a partial equilibrium analysis whereas it is endogenous in our setting.
Accordingly, although our model does not capture all feedback eﬀects, it is
a full-ﬂedged general equilibrium model in which oligopolistic ﬁrms account
for (i) strategic interactions within their group, (ii) the aggregate behavior
of the small ﬁrms, and (iii) endogenous income generated by proﬁt distrib-
ution.9 Stated diﬀerently, ﬁrms have rational conjectures about consumers’
behavior.
For any N ≥ 2,we may characterize the market equilibrium with M∗ > 0
by means of the following four conditions: (i) the demand functions, (ii) the
proﬁt-maximization conditions of MC-ﬁrms, (iii) the proﬁt-maximization
conditions of oligopolistic ﬁrms, and (iv) the zero-proﬁt condition of MC-
ﬁrms. In this way, we may view 0 as a “pseudo-player” who chooses the
mass of MC-ﬁrms for their proﬁts to be zero.
3.1 Existence of a mixed market equilibrium
For the moment, we assume the existence of a symmetric mixed market
equilibrium in which all oligopolistic ﬁrms choose the same output Q∗ sold
at the same price P ∗, whereas all MC-ﬁrms have the same output given by
(15). Hence, symmetry prevails within each group of ﬁrms but not between
groups.
The equilibrium analysis involves two steps: (i) we compute the equilib-
rium conditions when the size M of the MC-subsector is ﬁxed and (ii) we
determine the equilibrium value of M.
(i) The proﬁt Π of an oligopolistic ﬁrm at this market outcome is:





ρ − CQ − F. (18)
Moreover, the income of the representative consumer is:
Y = L + NΠ + Mπ
and determined in equilibrium by



















It then follows from (11) that






Substituting (15) into (2) and (4), we obtain the equilibrium values of the



















Although the equilibrium price of each variety is constant, (21) implies
that a larger mass of MC-ﬁrms makes competition in this subsector tougher
through more fragmented individual demands, thus leading to a lower indus-
try price index. This shows how varying the size of the MC-subsector aﬀects
the intensity of competition in the whole industry.
Finally, setting Q = Qj for all j = 1,...,N and using (20) shows that (13)













The system of four equations, (19), (20), (22) and (23), gives the equi-
librium outcome Q(M;N), Y(M;N), P(M;N), and Q0(M;N) conditional
to the size M of the MC-subsector and the number N of the oligopolistic
ﬁrms.By studying how this outcome changes with M, we are able to see how
the two subsectors interact at the mixed market equilibrium.
We start with the following result, the proof of which is given in Appen-
dix A.
16Lemma 2. For any given value of N, the equilibrium proﬁt of an MC-ﬁrm
π(M;N) is a decreasing function of M.
This implies that the entry and exit process in the MC-subsector yields
a unique outcome, which is globally stable. In other words, for any given
value of N, there exists at most one value M∗(N) such that π(M;N) = 0.
Unfortunately, the fact that the outputs Qj may be either strategic com-
plements or substitutes does not allow us the determine how Q and Q0 are
aﬀected when M varies. Nevertheless, we are able to characterize the im-
pact on equilibrium prices. First, (21) implies that the price index P0 of the
MC-subsector decreases as the size of this subsector rises. Then, as proven
in Steps 1 and 3 of Appendix A, increasing M has a similar impact upon P
and P.
Proposition 1 Consider a symmetric equilibrium outcome in which the size
of the MC-subsector is exogenous and the number of oligopolistic ﬁrms is
ﬁxed. Then, both the industry price index and the price at which oligopolistic
ﬁrms sell their output decrease when the mass of MC-ﬁrms increases.
Hence, the entry of MC-ﬁrms makes the industry more competitive. In
other words, the market reacts as if the MC-subsector were a single big ﬁrm
whose size is given by Q0. This conﬁrms the idea that the agent 0 may be
interpreted as a pseudo-player. It should be kept in mind, however, that Q0
is the output index of the MC-subsector. It stems from the aggregation of
production decisions made by a continuum of small ﬁrms, and is not the total
output chosen by this pseudo-player.
(ii) To provide a full characterization of a symmetric market equilibrium,
we still have to determine the size M∗ of the MC-subsector. Using (16), the
























As to be expected, both the equilibrium mass and output index of the MC-
subsector move in the same direction. The market outcome Q∗(N), Q∗
0(N),
P∗(N), Y∗(N), and M∗(N) corresponding to N is then described by the ﬁve
simultaneous equations (23), (19), (20), (24) and (25) whose unknowns are
Q, Q0, P, Y, and M.
17Having determined all the equilibrium conditions, we are now equipped
to show the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric mixed equilibrium. In
Appendix B.1, we show that, provided that oligopolistic ﬁrms earn positive














1−ρ (1 − α)(1 − ρ)







where S is linear and downward sloping inF/L, S(N;0) > 0 and S(N;F/L) →
0 when F/L → 1/N.
In Appendix B.2, we show that there exists a function B(F/L), where B
is strictly increasing, B(0) = 0 and B(F/L) → ∞ when F/L → (1 − α)ρ,
such that oligopolistic ﬁrms’ proﬁts are positive if and only if B(F/L) < f/L.
As to be expected, high values of F/L prevent big ﬁrms to be active at the
market outcome.
Consequently, the domain of the (F/L,f/L)-plane for which a mixed
market equilibrium prevails is, therefore, deﬁned by the intersection of the
two sets delineated by B(F/L) < f/L and f/L < S(N;F/L). It is non-
empty because S is strictly decreasing with S(N;0) > 0, while B is strictly
increasing with B(0) = 0. Consequently, we have:
Proposition 2 If F/L < 1/N for N ≥ 2, then there exists a unique sym-
















Thus, the existence of a mixed market equilibrium depends on the ratios
of ﬁxed costs, F and f, and the size of the economy, L. In Figure 1, we
depict the domain of parameters in which a mixed market exists. Depending
on the relative values of F/L and f/L, the economy may have a handful
of big ﬁrms and/or a myriad of small ﬁrms. In particular, increasing the
value of f/L leads to the widening of the range of (F/L)-values for which
the market involves oligopolistic ﬁrms only. This is because the entry of MC-
ﬁrms becomes harder. Regarding the impact of a steadily increase in F/L, the
range of (f,L)-values for which the market involves MC-ﬁrms shrinks. This
is due to an income eﬀect that stems from the general equilibrium nature
of our setting. As shown by the bottom triangle delineated by the locus
B(F/L) = f/L in Figure 1, when F/L rises there is room for a decreasing
mass of MC-ﬁrms. Indeed, the income Y decreases because oligopolistic
ﬁrms earn lower proﬁts. Hence, (16) implies that the equilibrium proﬁts of
MC-ﬁrms decrease. More generally, as shown in Appendix B, increasing f
18or F allows a smaller mass of MC-ﬁrms to operate, which in turn leads each
oligopolistic ﬁrm to sell more. Note that the uniqueness of the symmetric
equilibrium implies that we stay on the same equilibrium path when the
number of oligopolistic ﬁrms varies.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Let us now brieﬂy consider the case of a single large ﬁrm (N = 1). As
long as there exists a competitive fringe (Q0 > 0 and P0 > 0), ﬁrm 1’s
demand function is not iso-elastic, which allows for the precise determination
of Q∗
1 > 0 and P∗
1 < ∞. However, the model remains asymmetric because
the market involves one big ﬁrm and a continuum of small ﬁrms. This makes
the analysis of the case where N = 1 very similar to that developed when
N ≥ 2. We have chosen, therefore, to skip it. As shown below, however, the
condition f/L < S (1;F/L) is always satisﬁed.10
3.2 The industry structure
First, as to be expected, there is no competitive fringe when the product is
homogeneous (see equation (C.3) in Appendix C). In other words, product
diﬀerentiation is necessary for the MC-ﬁrms to have a positive demand. That
said, our aim is to study how the two subsectors are aﬀected by the entry of
an oligopolistic ﬁrm.
Our ﬁrst two results follow from (25) and Appendix C.
Proposition 3 At the symmetric mixed market equilibrium,the equilibrium
output of an oligopolistic ﬁrm increases when the number of oligopolistic ﬁrms
rises.
Proposition 4 At the symmetric mixed market equilibrium, the equilibrium
mass and quantity index of the MC-subsector decrease when the number of
oligopolistic ﬁrms increases.
Thus, the entry of a large ﬁrm leads to the exit of a range of small
businesses and, therefore, to a contraction of the MC-subsector. To illustrate,
observe that Basker (2007) ﬁnds that, in the U.S. retail sector, Wall-Mart’s
competitive pressure has caused other stores, especially small ones, to shut
down. Combining the last two propositions then show that the shrinking of
the MC-subsector generated by the entry of a big ﬁrm is suﬃciently strong to
permit the expansion of each oligopolistic ﬁrm’s output.
10Observe that the case N = 1 is diﬀerent from Markham (1951) because unlike him we
assume that big and small ﬁrms move simultaneously.
19Proposition 5 has another important implication: the MC-subsector dis-
appears when the number of oligopolistic ﬁrms is suﬃciently large. Indeed,
using (C.3) in Appendix C, we see that there exists a single real number NO
such that M∗ = 0 and Q∗
0 = 0 once N is larger than or equal to NO. Observe










because the left hand side is decreasing in N ≥ 2, arbitrarily large at N = 1,
and negative when N is arbitrarily large. As to be expected, more big ﬁrms
are needed to trigger the exit of all small ﬁrms when the level of ﬁxed and/or
marginal costs in the MC-subsector is lower.
All of this suggests how the market structure evolves as more big ﬁrms
enter the market. First, when the number of large ﬁrms is much smaller than
NO, the economy involves a large mass of small ﬁrms; then, once N rises
while remaining lower than NO, the mass of small ﬁrms shrinks but remains
positive; last, when N exceeds NO, small ﬁrms disappear from the market
which becomes purely oligopolistic. During the whole process, the resource
constraint (14) is always satisﬁed, thus implying that the above dynamics
describes feasible allocations. Furthermore, the transition from the mixed
to the oligopolistic market does not involve any discontinuity in the market
equilibrium (see Appendix D). Finally, it is readily veriﬁed that NO > 1,
which means that the market outcome is always mixed in the presence of a
unique big ﬁrm. In other words, the case of a pure monopoly, in which the
big ﬁrm’s demand has a unit elasticity, never emerges.
In the foregoing, we have uncovered the existence of a trade-oﬀ between
the two subsectors: as the oligopolistic subsector expands, the MC-subsector
shrinks. This in turn allows us to determine the impact of an increase in
the number of oligopolistic ﬁrms on the equilibrium industry price index. All
else equal, Proposition 5 implies that the equilibrium price P∗ at which the
oligopolistic ﬁrms sell their varieties decreases when N rises. However, by
(21), the corresponding decrease in the mass of MC-ﬁrms leads to an increase
of P∗
0. Thus, the total impact on P is a priori undetermined. Yet, we are
able to show the following result in Appendix C.2.
Proposition 5 At the symmetric mixed market equilibrium,the industry price
index decreases when the number of oligopolistic ﬁrms rises.
In other words, despite the fact that the entry of a new oligopolistic
ﬁrm triggers the exit of some MC-ﬁrms, the entry of a new oligopolistic ﬁrm
makes the market more competitive. Thus, even though the exit of MC-ﬁrms
20tends to make the market less competitive (see Proposition 1), this eﬀect
is dominated by the pro-competitive eﬀect generated by the entry of a big
ﬁrm, thus making competition ﬁercer and prices lower. This is reminiscent
of Wall-Mart whose entry has led the U.S. retail sector to become “more
eﬃcient at providing consumers with the goods they want at better prices
and with increased convenience” (Basker, 2007, p.195).
Propositions 4 and 5 open the door to new welfare questions that we
investigate below.
4 Welfare
The purpose of this section is not to conduct a ﬁrst best analysis of the
industry structure. Instead, we aim at determining whether or not the en-
try of an oligopolistic ﬁrm is welfare-enhancing. Because preferences satisfy
the Gorman polar form, the level of social welfare may be described by the
indirect utility corresponding to the utility of the representative consumer.11







and determine the impact of increasing N upon both P∗ and Y∗ to determine
how entry aﬀects total welfare. We already know from Proposition 5 that P∗
goes down. It remains to consider how Y∗ is aﬀected. Using (24), we imme-
diately see that a lower value P∗ leads to a higher value of Y∗. Proposition 5
thus implies:
Proposition 6 At the symmetric mixed market equilibrium, the consumer
income increases when the number of oligopolistic ﬁrms increases.
Using (27), the following result immediately follows from the fact that,
when N increases, P∗goes down while Y∗goes up.
Proposition 7 At the symmetric mixed market equilibrium, the social wel-
fare increases when the number of oligopolistic ﬁrms rises.
11For the welfare analysis developed below to be meaningful, preferences must be deﬁned
over a given space of varieties. This can be accomplished by assuming that preferences
(1) are a priori deﬁned on the Cartesian product of (i) the vector space of dimension
equal to the largest integer smaller than or equal to L/N, and (ii) the functional space
of measurable functions deﬁned on [0,L/f]. The varieties not supplied by the market are
then given a weight equal to zero in (1).
21In words, this result has the following major implication: a diﬀerentiated
market with several big ﬁrms and a small number of small ﬁrms is more eﬃ-
cient than a market with fewer big ﬁrms and a larger number of small ﬁrms.
This runs against the conventional wisdom according to which a multitude
of small ﬁrms does better in terms of eﬃciency than a handful of large ones.
This contrast in results is due to the fact that the mixed market model al-
lows for direct comparisons of diﬀerent market structures within a uniﬁed
framework, thus shedding new light on their relative merits. It is also worth
stressing that the above proposition is obtained in the case of a diﬀerentiated
industry in which consumers have a preference for variety. Proposition 7 thus
shows that the pro-competitive eﬀect associated with the presence of large
ﬁrms dominates the decrease in variety generated by the exit of several small
ﬁrms. Note also that Proposition 7 imposes no speciﬁc restriction on the
parameters of the economy, apart from those stated in Proposition 2 that
guarantee the existence of a mixed market outcome.
Given that Y∗(N) = L + NΠ∗(N), Proposition 6 also implies that total
proﬁts in the economy rise with the number of oligopolistic ﬁrms. It should be
stressed that this result is the outcome of the interplay of several intertwined
eﬀects. First, since the proﬁt of MC-ﬁrms decreases with N and M, the
mass of MC-ﬁrms decreases as more large ﬁrms enter the market. The exit
of MC-ﬁrms, which are less competitive than oligopolistic ﬁrms, generates a
market expansion eﬀect that allows the output index Q∗ to increase. This in
turn leads to a lower price index P ∗. Consequently, both consumer income
and social welfare increase when N rises. This not the end of the story,
however. The income eﬀect stressed by Proposition 6 also fuels the expansion
of the market for each type of ﬁrms, thus allowing more MC-ﬁrms to stay in
business. However, as shown by Proposition 1, even though this eﬀect slows
down the exit of small ﬁrms, it is not suﬃciently strong to break it oﬀ.
5 Concluding remarks
Mixed markets are plentiful in the real world, one reason being that keeping
a competitive fringe seems to be a political concern in several countries.
Yet, our analysis suggests that consumers gain from the presence of large
ﬁrms that make the market more competitive. Nevertheless, both in the
public and the general press, it is customary to ﬁnd the idea that the “small
business” world of yesterday was more appealing than the “large business”
world of today. Although sectors dominated by a few big ﬁrms were often
more standardized than those involving many small producers (think of the
“Model T” developed by Henry Ford), our analysis shows that consumers
22need not be better oﬀ under many small producers rather than under a
handful of large ones. This is because the variety argument put forward by
interest groups ignores (deliberately!) the pro-competitive eﬀect that the
entry of big ﬁrms brings about. Furthermore, the fact that large ﬁrms are
now able to exploit scope economies through ﬂexible manufacturing to supply
a large array of varieties invalidates, at least to a large extent, the variety
loss argument (Eaton and Schmitt, 1994). Even though it is a priori unclear
how the entry of a multi-product ﬁrm aﬀects the total supply of varieties,
this should make the case for our welfare result even stronger because the
entry of such a ﬁrm will increase even more the degree of competition within
the industry.
Note that collusion may be easier to enforce under a small number of
producers than under a large one. This seems to run against the desirability
of oligopolistic markets. It should be kept in mind, however, that eﬀective
competition policies allow one to dampen such a possibility. Furthermore,
the case of Japan, studied in detail by Garon and Mochizuki (1993), shows
that small-business associations aim to exchange their political inﬂuence for
governmental policies that compensate for their weakness in the market-
place. The same is likely to hold in several other countries. Whatever these
considerations as well as others not discussed here, our analysis suﬃces to
cast serious doubts on the idea that “small is beautiful” in modern market
economies. Although we would be the last to claim that “large is beautiful”,
it is our contention that “small need not be beautiful”.
To conclude, observe that our setting can be applied to study various
issues that have been investigated using the framework of monopolistic com-
petition only. The ﬁrst question that comes to mind is the opening to trade
of two economies that have diﬀerent market structures. Our analysis sug-
gests that, by exacerbating competition with big ﬁrms, economic integration
might trigger the progressive disappearance of small ﬁrms. This need not
aﬀect the two countries in the same way. Another example is the impact
of large department stores or shopping malls that locate at the outskirts of
a city, while competing with a large number of small shops located at the
city center. In such a context, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the exit
of small shops might make consumers living downtown worse-oﬀ when they
have a bad access to the shopping malls. We leave these topics for future
research.
23Appendix A
The argument involves six steps.
1. Consider the impact on P of increasing M. Substituting (22) into (20)



















































Substituting (A.1) into (23),we obtain
P
￿











































































(A.2) may be rewritten as follows:
G(H;N) ≡ N
1−2ρ





Given M and N, G is increasing in H, while G(0) = 0 and G(H) → ∞ when
H → 1. Therefore, G(H) = 1 has a unique solution in H ∈]0,1[, so that
(A.2) has a unique solution P(M;N) > 0. Because both G(H) and H are
strictly increasing in M, P(M;N) is strictly decreasing in M.
2. Using (A.3), (A.2) may be rewritten as follows:
N
1−2ρ





24As long as Q > 0, (A.1) implies that H < 1. Step 2 implies that (A.4) has a
unique solution H(M;N), which is strictly increasing in M.
3. Since P = Y
1−ρ





librium price set by an oligopolistic ﬁrm is given by
P = N
1−ρ
ρ P(1 − H)
1−ρ
ρ . (A.5)
Because P is strictly decreasing (Step 1) and H is strictly increasing in M
(Step 2), it must be that P strictly decreases with M.





ρ − CQ − F
= YdN





ρ − F. (A.6)












= L−NF −Mf. (A.7)








1−ρ (1 − H) = P
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1−ρ(N − 1 + H)
1
1−ρ

















1−ρ(N − 1 + H)
1
1−ρ.
Replacing in (A.7) leads to
Y =
L − NF − Mf



















































1−ρ[N − 1 + H(M;N)]
1
1−ρ.
6. The numerator L − NF − Mf is decreasing in M, while the denom-
inator I is increasing in M because P is strictly decreasing (Step 1) and H
is strictly increasing (Step 2) in M. Therefore, for any given value of N, the
equilibrium proﬁt of an MC-ﬁrm π(M;N) is a strictly decreasing function of
M.
Appendix B
We determine a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a symmetric market
equilibrium to be mixed.
1. To do this, we ﬁrst describe the equilibrium conditions for a given value










Conditions (17) and (23) may then be rewritten as follows:
























We now account for the equilibrium of the MC-subsector:
H ≥ 0 π ≤ 0 Hπ = 0










Solve (B.1) for Yd and (B.2) for P. Substituting the resulting expressions
into π yields a new expression for π such that
sign π = sign J(H;N)













(1 − ρ)(1 − α)(L − NF)(1 − H)
￿
N [1 − (1 − ρ)(1 − α)(1 − H)] − ρ(1 − α)(1 − H)
2￿ − f










1−ρ (1 − ρ)(1 − α)(L − NF)
αN + ρ(1 − α)(N − 1)
− f
J(1;N) = −f.











1−ρ (1 − ρ)(1 − α)(L − NF)
αN + ρ(1 − α)(N − 1)
.
which implies that M∗(N) > 0.
Accordingly, provided that oligopolistic ﬁrms earn positive proﬁts, there









ρ [1 − H∗(N)]
1−ρ
ρ
















N [L − NF − M∗(N)f]
αN + (1 − α)ρ
￿




(1 − α)ρ[N − 1 + H∗(N)][1 − H∗(N)][L − NF − M∗(N)f]
CN
￿
αN + (1 − α)ρ
￿
N − [1 − H∗(N)]
2￿￿ .




(1 − α){(1 − ρ)N + ρ[1 − H∗(N)]}[1 − H∗(N)][L − NF − M∗(N)f]
N
￿
αN + (1 − α)ρ
￿
N − [1 − H∗(N)]
2￿￿ −F.





￿1−α (α)α(1 − α)2−αN
1
ρ(1−α)+α [L − NF − M∗(N)f]
αN + (1 − α)ρ
￿










Note, ﬁnally, that J(H;N) is shifted downward when f and/or F in-
creases, which implies that H decreases. Using (B.3) then shows that M∗(N)
also decreases with these two parameters.
2. It remains to determine under which condition oligopolistic ﬁrms earn










ρ − CQj − F (B.4)















is a bundle of parameters. Substituting (B.5) into (B.4) and using symmetry









so that the equilibrium income is given by
Y
























28Hence, Q∗ is a solution to










(1 − α)(1 − (C/γ)Q1−ρ)
− L







Note that Q∗ < Q.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Since NΠ(Q) is concave and strictly increasing, Γ(Q) is convex and
strictly increasing, and Γ(0) < NΠ(0) < 0 (see Figure 2), (B.6) has a unique
positive solution. Therefore, it must be that
NΠ(Q) > Γ(Q) ⇔ Q < Q
∗
NΠ(Q) = Γ(Q) ⇔ Q = Q
∗
NΠ(Q) < Γ(Q) ⇔ Q > Q
∗.
Furthermore, because Γ(0) = −L and Γ(Q) → ∞ when Q → Q, Γ(Q) = 0
has a unique solution Qs ∈]0,Q[.
The comparison of Q∗ and Qs involves three cases.
(i) If Π(Qs) < 0, then NΠ(Qs) < Γ(Qs) = 0, so that Qs > Q∗. Since
Π(Q) is increasing, it must be that Π(Q∗) < Π(Qs) < 0.
(ii) If Π(Qs) = 0, then NΠ(Qs) = Γ(Qs) = 0, so that Qs = Q∗ since (B.6)
has a unique positive solution.
(iii) If Π(Qs) > 0, then NΠ(Qs) > Γ(Qs) = 0, so that Qs < Q∗. In this
case, it must be that Π(Q∗) > Π(Qs) > 0 because Π is increasing. All of this
implies that
Π(Q
∗) > 0 ⇔ Π(Qs) > 0.
Therefore, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the oligopolistic ﬁrms’
proﬁts to be positive at the mixed market equilibrium may be obtained by
studying the sign of Π(Qs).
Note that
Γ(Q) ￿ 0 ⇔ G(Q
ρ) ≡ γ
2Q
2ρ + (1 − α)(1 − ρ)LγQ
ρ − (1 − α)ρLF ￿ 0.
29Replacing −CQs in Π(Qs) shows that Π(Qs) > 0 is equivalent to G(Qρ
s) > 0.








(1 − α)(1 − ρ)2L
+ 1 − 1
￿
is the positive solution of the quadratic equation G(Qρ) = 0 in which Qρ is
the unknown. Since Γ is increasing and Γ(Qs) = 0, we have:












Substituting Qr in the last inequality yields




































1. Since the function NΠ(Q) is moved upward when N increases while Γ(Q)
remains the same, it must be that Q∗ increases when N rises (see Figure 2).
















It follows from this expression that P∗ and Q∗ move in opposite directions.


































1−ρ (1 − α)(1 − ρ)
￿







































which decreases because the large ﬁrms’ output Q∗ increases. Note that the
resource constraint M∗ < (L − NF)/f is always satisﬁed at (C.3).
Appendix D
We show the continuity of the market equilibrium at NO, which is the unique
solution to M∗(N) = 0. Clearly, J(0;N) ≤ 0 implies that π∗(H;N) < 0 for
all H > 0. Hence, when M∗(N) = 0, the values (B.3) in which H∗(N) = 0








αN + (1 − α)ρ(N − 1)
QO =
(1 − α)ρ(N − 1)(L − NF)
CN [αN + (1 − α)ρ(N − 1)]
ΠO =
[(1 − ρ)N + ρ](1 − α)(L − NF)









ρ +α(N − 1)1−α(L − NF)
αN + (1 − α)ρ(N − 1)
.
This means that the market equilibrium values are continuous functions of
N ≥ 2.
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